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THE ARCHITECTURE OF CONTEMPORARY HEALTHCARE
REFORM AND EFFECTIVE MARGINAL TAX RATES
Seth J. Chandler*
I. THE STORY
It is the year 2014. You are thirty-five years old with a wife and two
kids, and you have recently graduated law school. You've set up a small
criminal defense practice right here in Jackson, Mississippi. Last year, you
earned $85,000. Not bad. But, there's a problem. Your wife developed a
chronic medical condition a few years back that costs $30,000 per year on
average.' You worry it could go higher if she has a bad year. Paying this
amount has just about exhausted an inheritance she received from her
mother. Until this year, you hadn't been able to get health insurance at a
price you could afford,2 particularly given those education loans you still
have to pay off ' And you were concerned that in another year or so you'd
be bankrupt. Who knows how your wife would get medical care after that.
But, things are looking up. Late in 2013, pursuant to section 1311(b) of
the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA), 4 which, as
* Law Foundation Professor of Law, University of Houston Law Center, Co-Director, Health
Law & Policy Institute. A.B., 1979, Princeton University; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983. I would like
to dedicate this article to the late Professor David F. Bradford (Princeton University), who got me
interested thirty years ago in issues such as those raised by the passage of the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (to be codified in scattered sections of 26 & 42
U.S.C.). I hope he would not be embarrassed by what his teachings have wrought.
1. You believe your median medical expenses are about $28,000 per year.
2. Prior to the enactment of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, (PPACA) Pub. L.
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, federal law did not generally prohibit insurers of individual families from
imposing pre-existing condition limits or charging premiums that reflect risk. Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified in scat-
tered sections of 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), did limit the circumstances under which insurers could impose
pre-existing condition limits, but did not place serious limits on the prices these insurers could charge
persons with pre-existing conditions. See Sara Rosenbaum, Insurance Discrimination on the Basis of
Health Status: An Overview of Discrimination Practices, Federal Law, and Federal Reform Options, 37 J.
L. MED. & ETHics 103, 109-10 (2009); Catherine Chou, Insuring Medically Uninsurable Individuals, 27
J. LEGAL MED. 443, 451-52 (2006). Mississippi is typical of many states in likewise permitting pre-
existing condition exclusions and in not heavily regulating health insurance premiums. Georgetown
University Health Policy Institute, Mississippi Consumer Guide to Getting and Keeping Health Insur-
ance (2007), http://healthinsuranceinfo.net/getinsured/mississippilindividual-health-plans/individual-
health-insurance-sold-by-private-insurers/.
3. The average cumulative educational debt burden of students graduating American law
schools was about $85,000 as of 2007-08, and is likely higher now given significant escalation in the price
of legal education. MARK KANTRowrTz, GROWTH IN CUMULATIVE EDUCATION DEBT AT COLLEGE
GRADUATION (2009), http://www.finaid.org/educators/20090730cumulativedebt.pdf. An earlier report
by the American Bar Association had reported median law student debt on graduation as between
$60,000-$80,000 as of 1999-2000. ABA COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING
THE BURDEN: LAW STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE (2003), http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/lrap/ltrapfinalreport.pdf.
4. Pub. L. No. 111-148 (2010). The provisions of this statute will be codified at various places in
the United States Code. Although this codification is not complete, the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel has published a table on the Internet indicating where various provisions will be codified. See
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amended,' became law in 2010, Mississippi created a "Health Benefit Ex-
change."6 You can now buy a "silver plan" without pre-existing conditions
or medical underwriting that affects your non-smoking family.' In many
ways, it's been a great thing. Your gross premium is $8,722,8 but because
OFFICE OF THE LAw REVISION COUNSEL, UNITED STATES CODE TABLE OF CLASSIFICATIONS FOR PUB-
LIc LAWS, http://uscode.house.gov/classification/tbl111pl_2nd.htm. Most of the bill will be codified
within title 42 (the Public Health and Welfare) and title 26 (the Internal Revenue Code) of the United
States Code. References to the United States Code in this article rely on the information contained in
this table.
5. PPACA was amended less than two weeks later by the enactment of the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCEARA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010).
6. The consequences under PPACA of a state's failure to establish a health benefit exchange are
important yet not entirely clear. Section 1311 of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18031, is written in mandatory
terms. It provides: "Each State shall, not later than January 1, 2014, establish an American Health
Benefit Exchange (referred to in this title as an 'Exchange') for the State that- (A) facilitates the
purchase of qualified health plans; (B) provides for the establishment of a Small Business Health Op-
tions Program (in this title referred to as a 'SHOP Exchange') that is designed to assist qualified em-
ployers in the State who are small employers in facilitating the enrollment of their employees in
qualified health plans offered in the small group market in the State; and (C) meets the requirements of
subsection (d)." If, indeed, states suffer some sort of loss in the event they fail to establish an exchange,
the prospect of constitutionally suspect "commandeering" arises. See New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161 (1992) (stating that Congress "may not simply 'commandee[r] the legislative processes of
the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program."' (quoting
Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981))). Section 1321(c) of
PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18041, which is captioned "Failure to Establish Exchange or Implement Require-
ments," appears to suggest, however, that the only consequence of such a failure is that the federal
government "shall (directly or through agreement with a not-for-profit entity) establish and operate
such Exchange within the State . . . ." A lawsuit filed by thirteen state attorneys general seven minutes
after the passage of PPACA (and joined by five additional attorneys general in April 2010) alleges that
a state not forming an exchange must either drop out of the Medicaid program or provide coverage for
uninsured individuals with incomes between 133 percent and 200 percent of the federal poverty level.
Complaint at 10-11, Florida v. U.S. Dep't of Health and Human Servs., Case No. 3:10-CV-91(N.D. Fla.
filed March 23, 2010). The plaintiffs cite no statute or other authority to support this position.
7. Section 1201 of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg et. seq., amends the Public Health Service Act, 58
Stat. 682 to prohibit pre-existing condition exclusions in any group health plan or in group or individual
health insurance. It likewise prohibits medical underwriting except for tobacco use. These provisions
takes effect on January 1, 2014, pursuant to section 1253 of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg (notes
following).
8. There are different estimates of how many gross premiums will be in policies purchased
through the Exchange. The Congressional Budget Office in its modeling of the effects of healthcare
reform has used numbers such as $14,100 in its work. Congressional Budget Office, Letter to Sen.
Harry Reid (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/108xx/docl0822/Reid-SubsidyExamples_11-
20.pdf. Currently, health insurance for families costs about $13,375. The Kaiser Family Foundation &
Health Research & Educational Trust, Employer Health Benefits (2009), available at http://ehbs.kff.
org/pdfl2009/7936.pdf. The Kaiser Family Foundation also has a calculator that allows one to compute
the estimated gross premium for health insurance in 2009 dollars under PPACA as a function of age and
whether a single or family policy is purchased. See Health Reform Subsidy Calculator - Premium
Assistance for Coverage in Exchanges/Gateways, http://healthreform.kff.org/SubsidyCalculator.aspx.
Some exploration of that calculator suggests that the costs of health insurance in 2009 dollars under the
Kaiser model can be very well approximated using the following cubic polynomials. For individuals, the
formula is 2.258 + 0.02396 xA3, where "x" is the rated age of the enrollee. For families, the formula is
6,322 + 0.05598 xA3, where "x" is the rated age of the enrollees. There is reason to believe the Kaiser
estimates are systematically low because the premiums they generate are less than current amounts, but
I use them in this article, as they are a generally accepted reference and because they provide a con-
servative estimate of the effects of PPACA on effective marginal tax rates. One possible explanation of
the low estimates provided by Kaiser is that the "Silver" policies on which they are based require
greater cost-sharing than many current policies provided through an employer.
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you're not really wealthy, you get a $647 tax credit.' So, the net cost is $8,075,
which you find you can just afford. Plus, although the cost-sharing maxi-
mum on these policies is normally $12,000,10 because of your moderate
wealth, it' s been reduced to $8,000. So, you end up spending less on average
on medical care than you used to and you have security against risk. You
certainly don't have to pay any sort of penalty for failing to purchase insur-
ance.11 You're glad you voted to re-elect Obama in 2012. In fact, a local
Congressman who bucked local sentiment and voted for PPACA back in
2010, wants you to appear in a commercial as a "success story of
ObamaCare."
You now have the possibility of expanding your practice and hiring a
bright young graduate of Mississippi College of Law. You figure that if you
do so, you can increase your yearly gross by $8,500 to $93,500. And you
could help the economy, too. There are some risks, to be sure, but it seems
like a good idea. You realize, however, that 14.3% of the increase is going to
go to Uncle Sam for federal income taxes.12 And another 15.3% is going to
be chewed up by FICA. And the State of Mississippi would take another
4.8% because of its state income tax. So, even before PPACA, you were only
going to keep about 65.6%. That would have been better than nothing. But,
you now discover that with increased income, your health insurance pre-
mium tax credit is going to shrink to zero, and your expected out-of-pocket
costs are going to go from $7,938 to $10,622.13 So, you're going to end up
paying about $3,33114 more in medical expenses than you otherwise would.
Thus, your net upside on taking a risk that might earn you $8,500 is an un-
satisfying $2,252. You decide that with an effective marginal tax rate of
9. 26 U.S.C. § 36B (2010).
10. Under section 1302(c)(1)(A) of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18022, the cost-sharing maximums for
an "essential health benefits plan" cannot exceed those used by "high deductible health plans," as
defined in 26 U.S.C. § 223(c)(2)(A)(ii), which is currently $11,600 for families. See Rev. Proc. 2009-29,
2009-22 I.R.B. 1050. This ceiling is adjusted each year pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 223(g) (2006) to take
account of inflation. I assume that this number will have increased slightly by 2014.
11. Section 1501 of PPACA, as amended, creates a new section 5000A of the Internal Revenue
Code that requires that once the health benefit Exchanges come on line, most persons who do not have
health insurance ultimately pay the greater of $695 per uninsured household member (up to $2,085) or
roughly 2.5% of their income as a federal tax penalty. The amount will be phased in, however, so that
in 2014 and 2015 the tax penalties will be less. There are exceptions for certain religious groups and
members of health-sharing ministries, as well as an exemption for persons for whom the net premium is
more than 8% of their income. This latter group is likely to be composed primarily of persons who are
older, who thus have high premiums, and who are not extremely wealthy. A family charged a premium
on the basis of a person being age sixty and whose income is 6 FPL ($132,000 for a family of four) is
likely to be exempt from the section 1501 payment.
12. This article contains a number of computations of federal income tax liability along with
FICA tax liability and state income tax liability. These figures must be estimates because individual
personal and financial circumstances can affect tax liability significantly. The estimates are obtained by
running data on representative individuals through the TAXSIM 9.6 software. See National Bureau of
Economic Research, TAXSIM Related Files at the NBER, http://www.nber.org/-taxsim/ (last visited
May 20, 2010).
13. The details behind this computation are shown in section V of this article.
14. This number is the sum of the lost $1,120 tax credit and an extra $3,670 in out-of-pocket
medical expenses.
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73.5%, you're going to forget about hiring. And appearing in that commer-
cial doesn't seem as good an idea anymore.
The story told here is a realistic prediction of what could happen to
one American family if PPACA is not significantly altered. Although these
experiences are more extreme than those that will confront some other
American families, and while the story fails to depict fully the benefits
wrought by enactment of PPACA, it nonetheless illustrates a fundamental
issue with the sort of healthcare reforms that were explored at the time
PPACA was enacted. Reform proposals, like PPACA, that share three
premises are likely to create high effective marginal tax rates that may af-
fect both national productivity and national tax revenue. These three
premises are: (1) a refusal to subsidize purchase of health insurance by per-
sons of more than moderate income; (2) an eagerness to extend private
health insurance coverage to people of very modest means; and (3) an in-
ability to reduce substantially the cost of health care provided through in-
surance. More broadly, given the current price of medical procedures, it is
nearly impossible to achieve anything close to affordable health insurance
for lower income levels without either imposing high marginal tax rates or
creating an extraordinarily expensive healthcare program funded through
deficit spending or higher taxes. As will be explored in this article, PPACA
does not even achieve the frontier of tradeoffs between these contradictory
objectives, however, because it is also infected with a phenomenon known
as "notching" in which marginal tax rates spike to levels over 100% as en-
rollees in insurance provided through the Exchanges move between dis-
crete income categories. Although the notching problem can, and should
be, cured before the program takes effect in 2014, it will still be difficult to
avoid high marginal tax rates on many Americans that distort economic
behavior without more fundamental changes to the architecture of contem-
porary healthcare reform.
II. PPACA SECTION 1401 (INTERNAL REVENUE CODE SECTION 36B)
I begin with a study of section 1401 of PPACA, which is captioned
"Refundable Tax Credit Providing Premium Assistance for Coverage
Under a Qualified Health Plan." Section 1401 is a central component of a
web of statutory provisions intended to make it possible for individuals and
families of moderate means to acquire health insurance through govern-
ment-sponsored health benefit "Exchanges" that are supposed to exist be-
ginning in 2014. The web addresses the current problem of perceived
"unavailability" and "unaffordability" in two ways: first, by limiting the un-
derwriting practices in which insurers selling through the exchange can en-
gage; and second, by making the effective price paid by purchasers of
insurance sold through the exchange an increasing function of income,
poorer purchasers will tend to pay less than wealthier purchasers, even if




Section 1401(a), which adds section 36B to the Internal Revenue
Code, implements the idea of an income-variant price for health insurance
through the mechanism of a refundable tax credit. The availability of this
credit depends on whether the collective incomes of group I will term "the
enrollees" - the persons covered under a policy issued through an Ex-
change - fall within a statutory window. The window is defined by a ratio I
will call "relative income," which is the household income of the enrollees
divided by the federal poverty line applicable to a family with that number
of enrollees. Thus, if a family had a household income of $44,100 and had
four enrolled members, its relative income would be 200% because, at pre-
sent, and as determined by the Office of Management and Budget," the
federal poverty line for a family of four in the continental United States is
$22,050. If the enrollees' relative income for a taxable year is 100% or
below, the enrollees are too poor to qualify for the tax credit, though they
may well be eligible for other forms of arguably more generous forms of
government assistance. If the enrollees' relative income is above 400%,
they do not qualify because they are too wealthy. 1 6
For enrollees who fall within the statutory window created by section
36B and who are otherwise eligible," the concept is that the enrollees
never ultimately pay more for health insurance premiums than the amount
that the government believes is affordable for them. This concept is imple-
mented by making the amount of the credit roughly equal to the amount
for which the policyholder could purchase a decent (if not lavish) health
insurance policy through an Exchange - the "second lowest silver plan" -
minus the amount it is believed that the taxpayer could" afford." This lat-
ter number is an "applicable percentage," itself a piecewise linear function
of the ratio between the enrollees' household income (a variant of adjusted
gross income) and the enrollees' applicable federal poverty level, multi-
plied by the enrollees' "household income."1" This applicable percentage
goes from 2% up to 9.5% in a piecewise linear fashion. Thus, for a person
with a relative income of 2.4, the amount he or she would be deemed able
15. Internal Revenue Code § 36B(d)(3)(A) (section 1401(a) of PPACA) piggybacks the compu-
tation of the poverty line on to section 2110(c)(5) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1397jj(c)(5)
(2006), which in turns relies on 42 U.S.C. § 9902(2) (2006).
16. If one were searching for a single key that explained why PPACA creates such high effective
marginal tax rates, the best answer is the coupling of new section 36B(c)(1) of the Internal Revenue
Code and section 1402(b)(2) of PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18071. These provisions respectively limit eligibil-
ity for premium tax credits and eligibility for cost-sharing subsidies to households below 400% of the
applicable FPL. Because PPACA provides fairly generous subsidies up until this threshold, the conse-
quences of earning just more than 400% of FPL are very high.
17. The Chief Actuary of the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services estimates that 79% of
the enrollees in Exchange-based insurance plans will receive some form of subsidy. See RICHARD S.
FOSTER, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., ESTIMATED
FINANCIAL EFFECTS OF THE "PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT," AS AMENDED,
(2010), http://republicans.waysandmeans.house.gov/UploadedFiles/OACTMemorandum-onFinancial
.ImpactofPPACAas-Enacted.pdf.
18. The exact formula for the applicable percentage is set forth below, where "r" is the ratio of
household income to the applicable federal poverty line:
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to pay without undue financial strain would be 7.7% of his or her house-
hold income. By contrast, a person with a relative income of 2.6 would be
deemed able to afford 8.34% of his or her household income for health
insurance premiums.19
The amount of the tax credit is potentially quite substantial. To take
an extreme example, consider a family of four with a relative income of
134 %20 that lives in a part of the country in which health costs are high and
which is rated by the insurer based on the relevant policyholder being sixty-
four years old. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that the gross an-
nual premium for a plan purchased through an exchange will be $25,591.21
The enrollees will be assumed to be able to pay about 3.1% of their in-
come, or $904, towards health insurance, and will receive a tax credit for
the difference of $24,687. Even in a less extreme case, say the family with
relative income of 178% that lives in a part of the country in which health
costs are average and which is rated by the insurer based on the relevant
policyholder being fifty years old, the tax credit will be $11,036.
The section 36B tax credit is refundable. This means that if the tax-
payer would ordinarily owe $2,000 in taxes, and the premium tax credit is
$3,000, the tax does not simply go to zero. Instead, the government pays
the taxpayer $1,000. The premium tax credit is, therefore, difficult to dis-
tinguish from cash. Not only is the section 36B tax credit refundable, but,
pursuant to section 1412 of PPACA,2 2 it will generally be paid mostly in
advance. Consider, for example, enrollees with $30,000 in household in-
come who face a premium of $4,320. Paying that amount up front, or even
at a rate of $360 per month, could be challenging for the many in this group
without sufficient savings. Under section 1412 of PPACA, however, the
government effectively advances the enrollees a monthly portion of the es-
timated amount of the premium tax credit for the year by paying a monthly
portion of the estimate to the insurer. The insurer then credits this govern-
ment payment against the enrollees' premium bill. The government usually
gets "repaid" for the advance because the amount of the actual premium
tax credit under section 36B is generally reduced by the amount of these
pre-payments. Thus, for example, if it turned out the taxpayer noted above
was actually entitled to a premium tax credit of $3,300 rather than $3,000,
the taxpayer's net premium tax credit would be $300. On the other hand, if
(2 r < 1.33
-4.82353 + 5.88235 r 1.33 r < 1.5
1 -2.9+4.6r 1.5sr<2
100 -0.7 + 3.5 r 2 sr < 2.5
0.8 + 2.9 r 2.5s r < 3
19.5 3 r < 4
19. The amount these families are likely to pay for health care (premiums plus cost-sharing) is
likely to be considerably more than these percentages due to the existence of deductibles, coinsurance,
and copayments.
20. Currently, this would be $29,547.
21. Health Reform Subsidy Calculator, supra note 8.
22. 42 U.S.C. § 18082.
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it turned out the taxpayer noted above was actually entitled to a premium
tax credit of $2,800, the taxpayer would have to add $200 to its federal
income taxes because the government would have advanced the insurer too
much money on the taxpayer's behalf.
The section 36B scheme is, however, ultimately more complex. First,
under section 36B(b)(2) of PPACA, the premium assistance amount is
capped by the cost of the cheapest policy actually sold in the applicable
Exchange. So, if the enrollees could purchase a "bronze" policy23 in the
Exchange for $380 per month, the premium assistance amount cannot be
more than $380. Second, under section 36B(f)(2)(B) of PPACA, the
amount of the subsidy can end up being more than one might suppose from
the basic formula. If, for example, the taxpayer described in the preceding
paragraph had actually been entitled to a premium tax credit of $2,500, the
taxpayer would have received the benefits of $3,000 in premium subsidies,
but would only have to repay the government $400 in additional taxes.
This is because PPACA caps taxpayer liability at $400 per year, with an
index for inflation. 24 Finally, there are numerous other qualifications and
provisos dealing with such matters as pediatric dental coverage, the treat-
ment of enrollees in states that increase premiums by requiring benefits in
addition to those required by section 1302 of PPACA,2 5 the treatment of
families that have lawfully present and unlawfully present members, and
various rules about indexing for inflation.
Economically, the subsidy provided by new section 36B of the Internal
Revenue Code decomposes into a lump sum payment (the amount the en-
rollees would have received in a premium tax credit if they were at the low
end of the eligibility window) and an income-contingent tax. Consider, for
example, enrollees who, if they had a "relative income" of 133% and pur-
chased a policy through an Exchange would have received a tax credit of
$12,208, but because they in fact had a relative income of 300% (while still
purchasing a policy through the Exchange), received a tax credit of just
$6,827.26 These enrollees may be thought of as having received $12,208 in
cash from the federal government as a reward for purchasing a policy
through the Exchange but paying an extra tax of $5,381 because of their
income.
The magnitude of the effective income tax created by section 36B is
not trivial. Although in the example above, the average marginal tax rate
23. A bronze policy provides "a level of coverage that is designed to provide benefits that are
actuarially equivalent to 60 percent of the full actuarial value of the benefits provided under the plan."
PPACA § 1302(d)(1)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(1)(A). This percentage is determined by reference to a
"standard population" and (explicitly) "without regard to the population the plan may actually provide
benefits to." PPACA § 1302(d)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 18022(d)(2)(A).
24. PPACA § 1401(a); I.R.C. § 36B(f)(2)(B).
25. 42 U.S.C. § 18022.
26. Such could be the case for a family living in a medium cost area and as to whom the insurer
rated the policyholder of being age fifty.
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imposed by section 36B on the enrollee above would be "just" 14.7%,27
some enrollees will face considerably higher rates. Indeed, the rate may
exceed 100%. Consider, for example, the family of three with a relative
income of 390%, which with current rates would be $71,409. Suppose fur-
ther that the premium to cover the entire family with the second lowest
cost silver plan is $12,000.28 That family would receive a premium tax
credit of $5,216. Now suppose the family earns an extra $4,000 in income,
taking them to $75,409. They now receive a tax credit of zero because their
relative income exceeds 400%. Thus, their average marginal tax rate for
this increment in income is 130%. The family is better off forgoing the
raise or just giving the money away to charity. This high rate exists because
of the "cliff" created by denying any premium tax credit to persons with
relative incomes of more than 400% of FPL, while offering substantial pre-
mium tax credits to persons with relative incomes just below 400% of FPL.
Alternatively, consider the family identical to that described above but
with a relative income of 280% and the opportunity to earn an additional
0.2 FPL in income. Their average marginal tax rate over that increment in
income is 17.6%.
Of course, for others, the effective marginal tax rate will be lower than
the 14.7% in the initial example. The family with an income that is 1.5
times the applicable FPL, but which has the opportunity to earn an addi-
tional 0.2 FPL in income, pays an average marginal tax rate on that incre-
ment of 11.8%.
Two sets of graphics help summarize these findings. The first set
shows net premiums (premiums after the tax credit) as a function of rela-
tive income for enrollees of different ages and different family sizes. For
each graphic, the x-axis shows the relative income of the enrollees. The y-
axis computes net premium.
27. This is because the incremental tax the enrollee paid is $5,371, and the incremental income
the enrollee earned was 1.66 (300% less 134%) multiplied by $22,050, the current FPL for a family of
four. This latter product is $36,603. The quotient of $5,371 and $36,603 is 0.147.
28. The Kaiser Family Foundation estimates that a family "silver" policy in a medium cost area in
which the policyholder is forty-seven years old will face a gross plan premium of $11,950. See The
Kaiser Family Foundation, supra note 8.
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Net Premiums For Different Ages and Family Sizes
The second set of graphics shows the effective marginal tax rate cre-
ated by section 36B. Again, the x-axis shows the relative income of the
enrollees. The y-axis now shows the ratio of the change in net premiums
that would result from a 10% increase in relative income to the dollar in-
crease in income resulting from a 10% increase in relative income. The y-
axis thus reflects the effective marginal tax rate. Notice that the rate,
though generally significant over most levels of relative income between
3432010]
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1.33 and 4, and over most ages, spikes to extraordinarily high levels as rela-
tive income hits the eligibility cutoff of 4. Here, particularly for older indi-
viduals who will face higher premiums, the effective marginal tax rate
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ome relative income
Effective Marginal Tax Rates For Different Ages and Family
Sizes Reslting from Section 36B (PPACA section 1401) Tax Credit
These graphics suggest that, if the effective tax created by section 1401
of PPACA were the only consideration, the effect on incentives to work
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and to take risk would be significant yet somewhat moderate, except when
enrollees facing high premiums had incremental incomes that would place
them above the 400% eligibility threshold. As discussed further below,
however, other provisions of PPACA impose additional marginal taxes that
augment a background of existing income-based taxes, such as federal in-
come tax, "FICA," and, in many states, a state income tax. The accumula-
tion of these taxes gives rise to the most significant effects on effective
marginal tax rates and, derivatively, incentives to work.
III. PPACA SECTION 140229
In addition to reducing premiums for many persons purchasing health
insurance through an Exchange, PPACA also reduces the amount many of
these persons can expect to pay for "out-of-pocket" (OOP) costs. These
are costs that would have been covered by enrollees' health insurance but
for the existence of deductibles, coinsurance, and copays. This reduction in
what is commonly called "cost-sharing" is accomplished by section 1402,
captioned "Reduced Cost-Sharing for Individuals Enrolling in Qualified
Health Plans." Just as section 1401(a) of PPACA makes the reduction in
premium assistance depend inversely on "income," so too does section
1402.
A. The Basic Relationship
The relationship created by section 1402 of PPACA between cost-shar-
ing and income is considerably more complex than that existing under sec-
tion 1401. The key is to understand that the policies sold by the Exchange
will come bundled with several cost-sharing parameters: (1) deductibles,
the amount that enrollees must first pay before the insurer has an obliga-
tion to pay; (2) coinsurance, the percentage of covered medical expenses in
excess of the deductible that enrollees must pay; (3) copayments, the
amount enrollees must pay for certain treatments or prescriptions regard-
less of the amount of the expense; and (4) an "out-of-pocket" maximum
(the "OOP limit") that caps the amount the enrollees must pay notwith-
standing what would otherwise be called for.30
Although section 1402 sketches out how these cost-sharing parameters
will respond to changes in the relative income of enrollees in insurance
plans sold through an Exchange, the precise details, some of which will be
important, remain to be developed by through the administrative process.
Section 1402 works primarily, but not exclusively, by reducing OOP limits
faced by poorer persons acquiring health insurance through an Exchange.
The first step is for the Secretary of Health and Human Services to take the
29. Section 1402 of PPACA is preliminarily codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18071.
30. Section 1302(c)(1) of PPACA (42 U.S.C. § 18022) caps the unmodified OOP limit at the
amount used for what are called "high deductible health plans." Currently these amounts are $5,800
for individual coverage and $11,600 for family coverage, Press Release, Treasury, IRS Issue 2009 In-
dexed Amounts for health Savings Accounts, http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp975.htm, al-
though these amounts adjust each year with inflation.
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estimates of income made in connection with determining premium tax
credits under new section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code (PPACA Sec-
tion 1401) and to use those estimates to reduce the OOP limit of enrollees
with incomes in the same 100% to 400% relative income window used by
section 1401 of PPACA and who likewise purchase a silver plan. The
amount of the initial reduction in the OOP limit component of cost-sharing
is a function of relative income.
Unlike section 1401, in which the amount of government assistance
varies continuously with relative income, section 1402 of PPACA places
relative income in bins and adjusts cost-sharing parameters according to
the bin in which the enrollees' relative income falls. If the relative income is
between 100% and 200%, the OOP limit is initially reduced by two-thirds.
Thus, if the OOP limit for wealthy purchasers of an exchange silver plan
was $4,000, the modified OOP limit for a person with a relative income of
180% would be $1,333. If the relative income is between 200% and 300%,
the OOP limit is initially reduced by one-half. In the example above, the
modified OOP limit would thus be $2,000. And if it is between 300% and
400%, the OOP limit is initially reduced by one-third. In the example
above, the modified OOP limit would be $2,667. These provisions signifi-
cantly limit the risk of high and potentially bankrupting medical expenses
faced by lower income enrollees.
B. CAVL and ARLII
The "Coordination with Actuarial Value Limit" (CAVL) proviso in
sectionl402(c)(1)(B) of PPACA may truncate these reductions in the OOP
limit. A reduction in out-of-pocket limits invariably increases the plan's
expected share of covered health expenses because there will invariably be
at least one individual who would not have hit the unmodified OOP limit,
but will hit the lower modified OOP limit, and will thus pay less under the
unmodified policy. The plan must make up the difference between the
amount the individual would have paid and the amount the individual does
pay. In mathematical terms, the reduction in the OOP limit has further
right-censored the distribution of payments by enrollees and thus mathe-
matically must increase the expected payments of the plan."
31. If medical expenses are, as is commonly assumed, distributed lognormally (with mean m and
median equal to the product of k (O<k<1) and the mean), the distribution of expenses (u) paid for by
the insured under a policy that has, as its cost-sharing elements, a deductible (d), a coinsurance rate (c)
and an out-of-pocket limit (oop limit) may be written using the piecewise formula set forth below:
I _Logl 2-J ud
-Eric u <
2 12 -Logkl
1 Erfc Log su < ooplimit
2 1 uLog>k o
1 U > ooplimit
The actuarial value of such a policy may be written as:
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The CAVL proviso states that for that for enrollees with relative in-
comes between 100% and 150%, the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices will adjust the modified OOP limit upwards until the "plan's share of
the total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan" is 94%.32 For
enrollees with relative incomes between 150% and 200%, the Secretary
adjusts the modified OOP limit upwards until the "plan's share of the total
allowed cost of benefits provided under the plan" is 87%. For enrollees
with relative incomes between 200% and 250%, the Secretary adjusts the
modified OOP limit back upwards until the "plan's share of the total al-
lowed cost of benefits provided under the plan" is 73%. And any doubts
that the mechanism for decreasing the plan's share of the total allowed cost
of benefits is to increase the modified OOP limit appear to be dispelled by
section 1402(c)(1)(B)(ii) of PPACA, which provides: "The Secretary shall
adjust the out-of-pocket limits under paragraph (1) if necessary to ensure
that such limits do not cause the respective actuarial values to exceed the
levels specified in clause (i)." 3 3
1LogkM
1- ooplimit+(d-cd)Erfl L[ I +
2m 2 Logk]
-2 Log [k] + Log[km Log[ -+cdkmit
cmErf[ d-dErf[ +
2r -Log[k] 2 Log[k]
Log ckm Log cIm 1
cd Erf[ (-1+c) d.ooplimitJ I + ooplimh EJ[ (-1+c)d+ooplimit
2 -Log~ki 2 -Log[k]
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32. This is a higher value of expected plan payments than exists even under a "Platinum Plan," in
which expected plan payments are 90% and which is the level at which cost-sharing is least. PPACA
§ 1302(d) (42 U.S.C. §18022).
33. Whether PPACA requires any similar adjustment takes place for enrollees with income-to-
FPL ratios between 250% and 400% is not entirely clear. Section 1402(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV) of PPACA
appears to state that the OOP limit should be increased until the plan's share of the total allowed costs
of benefits provided under the plan is equal to 70%. One might thus expect that the enrollee's share of
the total allowed cost of benefits provided under the plan would then be 30%. The problem with this
reading, however, is that the silver plan (which insureds must purchase to be eligible for section 1402
assistance) already has, by definition, an actuarial value of 70%. It thus seems bizarre for section
1402(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) of PPACA to call for a reduction in the OOP limit when section
1402(c)(1)(B)(i)(IV) of PPACA calls for a second stage that would raise the OOP limit to precisely
where it began. If that were the intent, it would have been far simpler simply to delete sections
1402(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) and 1402(c)(1)(B)(i)(III) of PPACA. Any hope that the two provisions might be
reconciled by distinguishing between the "plan's share of the total allowed cost of benefits provided
under the plan," the standard used in section 1402(c)(1)(B) of PPACA, and "actuarial value" used in
section 1302 of PPACA, defining the silver plan, appears dashed by both the caption of section
1402(c)(1)(B) - "Coordination with Actuarial Value Limits" - and the precise language of section
1402(c)(1)(B)(ii) of PPACA in which the adjustments in the prior subparagraph are referred to as
adjustments in the "respective actuarial values."
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A second provision of section 1402, the "Additional Reductions for
Low Income Insureds" (ARLII), provides for further reduction in ex-
pected cost-sharing by the poorest purchasers of health insurance acquired
through an Exchange. Individuals with relative incomes between 100% to
150% see the cost-sharing parameters reduced until their share of expected
"total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan" is just 6% (94%
for the plan); individuals between 150% to 200% have a corresponding
figure of 13% (87% for the plan) and individuals between 200% to 250%
now have a corresponding figure of 27% (73% for the plan) rather than the
30% (70% for the plan) existing under unmodified silver plans.3 4 The in-
teraction of CAVL, which sets a cap on the actuarial value of the plan, and
ARLII, which sets a floor on the actuarial value of the plan, could thus
result in a very steep decline in the actuarial value of the plan - and a
corresponding major change in its cost-sharing parameters - as the relative
income of the enrollees crosses 250%.
C. The Economic Effects of Section 1402
The increase in expected cost-sharing as a function of income can like-
wise be decomposed into a lump sum benefit (distribution of the maximum
amount of expected cost-sharing reductions) plus an expected tax that de-
pends on income. Consider, for example, a family that knows to a certainty
they will have cost-sharing of more than the out-of-pocket limit under their
unmodified silver plan. If that family earned a relative income of 3.9, sec-
tion 1402 of PPACA potentially reduces their OOP limit by up to one-
third. Thus, if the unmodified OOP limit under their policy is $12,000, and
the modified OOP limit is thus $8,000, they will end up spending just $8,000
out of pocket on medical expenses." If that family's relative income in-
creases by 0.2 FPL to 4.1, the family will likely spend $12,000 out of pocket
on medical expenses.3 6 Since the current FPL for a family living in the
continental United States is currently $22,050, an increase in income of
$4,410 will result in an effective "cost-sharing tax" of $4,000, or 90.7%.
The only other apparent possibility for how to handle OOP limits for enrollees with income-to-
FPL ratios between 200% to 400% would appear to be one under which the Secretary pays the plan as
if the modified OOP limits had been adjusted upwards to restore 70% actuarial value, but the enrollees
pay according with the unadjusted modified OOP limits in place. Although this interpretation recon-
ciles sections 1402(c)(1)(A)(ii)-(iii) and 1402(c)(1)(B)(i)(III) of PPACA and might be permitted by
section 1402(c)(3) of PPACA, which calls for the Secretary to subsidize the plans to account for reduc-
tions in cost-sharing, it makes it very difficult to understand the requirement in section 1402(c)(1)(B)(ii)
that the Secretary adjust the out-of-pocket limits to ensure that the actuarial values meet the require-
ments of section 1402(c)(1)(B)(i).
34. The figures under the original version of PPACA were less generous. Section 1001(b) of
HCEARA modified PPACA, 42 U.S.C. § 18071, however, to require even greater cost-sharing subsi-
dies than the original PPACA.
35. If the family's medical payments are $30,000, they will hit the $8,000 OOP limit so long as the
coinsurance percentage under the plan is greater than the quantity $8,000 minus the deductible divided
by $30,000. This is almost certain to be true for all silver plans.
36. The family will end up paying $12,000 out of pocket so long as the coinsurance percentage
under the plan is greater than the quantity $12,000 minus the deductible divided by $30,000. This is
likely to be true for all silver plans.
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Again, it is easy to find other situations in which section 1402 by itself
generates high effective marginal tax rates for enrollees with these sorts of
high expected medical expenses. A high-expense family of two with a rela-
tive income of 2.95 is quite likely37 to face an effective marginal tax rate of
137.3% if its income increases by 0.1 FPL.3 8 On the other hand, a family of
six with a relative income of 2.7 faces an effective marginal tax rate of just
16.9% if its income increases by 0.4 FPL.3 9 . And a family of four fortunate
enough to see its relative income double from 2.1 to 4.2 would face an
effective marginal tax rate of "just" 13%.40 Because of the discontinuities
in the relationship between cost-sharing and income, effective marginal tax
rates can vary significantly depending on the precise before and after in-
comes of the enrollees.
The picture is more complicated for enrollees with low expected medi-
cal expenses because there are two potential effects of section 1402 of
PPACA: (1) a change in deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance for en-
rollees with relative incomes under 250%; and (2) a change in OOP limits
for all those eligible, though the limit is unlikely to be hit. Suppose, for
example, an unmodified family silver plan has a deductible of $4,000, a
coinsurance percentage of 20%, no copayments, and an $11,600 OOP limit.
It is plausible to believe that, for an enrollee family with a relative income
of 1.9, section 1402 of PPACA would modify those terms to a $1,330 de-
ductible, a coinsurance percentage of 9%, and an OOP limit of $4,000.
Consider the situation of a family who has purchased and who believes
they have a 40% chance of having expenses covered by the plan of $1,500,
a 50% chance of having expenses covered by the plan of $3,000, and a 10%
chance of having expenses covered by the plan of $25,000. This family
would expect on average to pay about $1,624 in out-of-pocket medical ex-
penses.41 Now, suppose, however, this family has the option to increase its
income by 0.2 FPL. The family would now quite likely face a modified
silver plan with far less generous cost-sharing subsidies - perhaps a $4,000
deductible, 30% coinsurance, and a $6,000 OOP limit. If so, the Jones'
expected out-of-pocket expenses would be $2700.42 Thus, by earning 0.2
37. One must say "quite likely" because one does not know for sure how the CAVL proviso in
section 1402 of PPACA will be implemented by the Secretary of Health and Human Services and
whether the out-of-pocket limit will in fact respond to it.
38. Assuming the out-of-pocket limit for the plan for persons with a relative income over four
was $12,000, the amount this family will pay out of pocket increases from $6,000 (half the regular out-
of-pocket limit) to $8,000 (two-thirds of the regular out-of-pocket limit), while the family's income
increases by just $1,457.
39. The amount the family will pay out of pocket increases from $4,000 to $6,000 when the fam-
ily's income increases by $11,812.
40. The amount the family will pay out of pocket increases from $6,000 to $12,000, while the
family's income increases by $46,305.
41. There is a 40% chance this family will pay $1,345, a 50% chance they will pay $1,480, and a
10% chance they will pay $3,460. The weighted average of these payments is $1,624.
42. There is a 40% chance this family will pay $1,500, a 50% chance they will pay $3,000, and a
10% chance the family will pay $6,000. The weighted average of these payments is $2,700.
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FPL more, they would lose $1,075. If the FPL for this family was $22,050,
the average marginal tax rate on this income would thus be 24.4%.43
By contrast, some families with low expected medical expenses will
face much smaller marginal tax rates caused by section 1402's tying of cost-
sharing subsidies to income. Suppose, for example, that the Jones family
initially had a relative income of 3.5 and had the option to increase that
relative income to 4.5. Assuming the CAVL proviso is not binding, the
only thing they would lose as a result of the income gain would be 10% of
facing the full $12,000 OOP limit, rather than a reduced $ 8,000 OOP limit.
Thus, the effective average marginal tax rate the family would face from
section 1402 when considering their option to increase income would be
just 1.0%.4 The low risk of confronting the lowered OOP limit, coupled
with the absence of any changes to deductible and coinsurance rates when
one starts at substantial relative incomes, keeps the numerator in this com-
putation small and the large possible increase in income keeps the denomi-
nator large.
The following four sets of graphics summarize the effects of section
1402 of PPACA for hypothetical families. The first set considers single-
member families. In each graphic, the x-axis measures the relative income
of the enrollees. The y-axis measures the expected cost-sharing the individ-
ual will face. Two lines are generated. The solid line shows the effect on
expected cost-sharing, assuming the CAVL proviso is not binding, and the
default reduction in the out-of-pocket limit provided for by PPACA takes
full effect. The dotted line shows the effect on expected cost-sharing, as-
suming that the CAVL proviso is binding, and the default reduction in the
out-of-pocket limit provided for by PPACA does not take full effect for
persons with a relative income over 250%. Each graphic is labeled with a
plot summarizing the distribution of healthcare expenses of the individual.
Notice that in each graphic there are various notches in which the expected
cost-sharing lurches upwards. These notches correspond to relative income
levels at which section 1402 of PPACA, with all of its complexity, is likely
to result in significant changes in cost-sharing arrangements. Also notice
43. Families with low expected medical expenses and yet lower incomes could also face steep
marginal tax rates. It is plausible that in order to bring the enrollee's expected share of the total al-
lowed cost of benefits down to 6% as required by section 1402 for enrollees with relative incomes of
100% to 150%, a silver plan would have to be modified so that its deductible was $400, its coinsurance
was 3%, and its OOP limit was $4,000. If so, a family with a distribution of medical expenses such as
the family discussed here but with a relative income of 1.4 who managed to purchase a policy through
an Exchange would have expected out-of-pocket expenses of $526. If the family gained 0.2 FPL in
income, the terms of their silver plan would become less generous with respect to cost-sharing. One
possibility is that the policy terms would change to a $1,330 deductible, a coinsurance percentage of 9%,
and an OOP limit of $4,000, which would mean that their expected out-of-pocket expenses would be
$1,624. Thus, this family would lose $1,098 as a result of gaining $4,410 in income (0.2 of an FPL for a
family of four), which would create an average marginal tax rate of 24.9%.
44. The family would have a 10% chance of paying $2,300 more in out-of-pocket expenses than
they would otherwise. Two hundred thirty dollars divided by $22,050 is about 1.0%.
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that, notches aside, the amount of cost-sharing can increase swiftly as rela-
tive income goes up. Often, over a distance of just 2 FPL, there is an in-
crease in expected cost-sharing of several thousand dollars. The graphic
thus recapitulates the fact that section 1402 of PPACA, even without its
notches, creates relatively high rates of effective marginal taxation.
Expected Cost Sharing for Individual Contracts
The second set of graphics explores the effective marginal tax rates for
individuals resulting from increased expected cost-sharing that results from
a 10% change in the relative income of individual enrollees. The x-axis on
each graphic shows the relative income of the individual. The y-axis shows
the effective marginal tax rate. Notice that tax rates are often zero but
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show very high notches over limited domains on initial relative income.
Frequently, marginal tax rates approach or exceed 50%. Marginal tax rates
are particularly high where the underlying distribution of medical expenses
has both a high mean and a high median.
Effective Marginal Tax Rates from Cost Sharing for Individual Contracts
The third set of graphics shows considers four-person families. As
before, in each graphic, the x-axis measures the relative income of the en-
rollees. The y-axis measures the expected cost-sharing the family will face.
Each graphic is labeled with a plot, summarizing the distribution of health-
care expenses of the family. Notches are present, just as was the case for
individuals. And, again, as was the case with individuals, the amount of
cost-sharing can increase swiftly as relative income increases. Often, over a
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Expected Cost Sharing for Family Contracts
The fourth set of graphics shows the effective marginal rate of taxation
on these families of four created by section 1402 of PPACA. The pattern is
similar to that seen with individuals. Although for some domains the effec-
tive marginal rate of tax is zero, in other domains the effective marginal tax
rate can be extremely high. Where mean and median medical expenses are
high, for example, the marginal tax rate increases over 200% for some val-
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IV. COMBINING SECTIONS 1401 AND 1402 wITH EXISTING
INCOME BASED TAXES
The real issue facing enrollees in insurance policies purchased through
an Exchange will not be the marginal tax rate created by section 1401
standing alone, or section 1402 standing alone, or even sections 1401 and
1402 standing together. It will be the cumulative effect of all taxation effec-
tively based on income, including federal income tax, FICA, and state in-
come taxes.45 The following six sets of graphics summarize the marginal
rates of taxation created by sections 1401 and 1402 of PPACA working to-
gether. Each set of graphics shows places relative income on the x-axis and
an effective marginal rate of taxation on the y-axis. The sets are broken
down according to the age and family size of the enrollees.
45. Other programs, state and federal, may further increase the effective marginal tax rate for
persons eligible for premium assistance and cost-sharing reductions under PPACA. These programs
include income-based repayment plans under the College Cost Reduction Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-
84, 121 Stat. 784 (2007), the National School Lunch Program, and the Low-Income Home Energy Assis-
tance Program. For a definitive discussion of the problem under discussion here, see Daniel Shaviro,
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The graphics show that PPACA's conditioning of premium subsidies
and cost-sharing reductions on relative income creates significant effective
marginal rates of taxation for virtually all levels of eligibility. This is true
regardless of the age of the enrollee, size of the enrollee's family, the en-
rollee's mean medical expenses, or the enrollee's median medical expenses.
Rates of more than 30% created by PPACA are common, and there are
frequently marginal rates of over 50%, particularly where section 1402 cre-
ates "notches." The rates of marginal taxation for older Americans fre-
quently exceed 100%. For reasons that will be set forth in more detail
below, but that should be apparent, these high rates of marginal taxation
have troubling implications for productivity. Persons faced with taxation
rates of more than 50% often decide to reduce their tax - generating activi-
ties or develop elaborate and costly tax avoidance schemes.
The situation, however, is actually more serious than the above graph-
ics suggest because PPACA "taxation" is not the only tax on income most
individuals will face. Most individuals also face federal income tax, FICA
tax, and state income tax. When these taxes are added in, the marginal
rates of taxation more frequently exceed 50% over far larger domains of
eligibility for PPACA subsidies.
V. FIVE FAMILIES
The combination of PPACA with existing income taxation schemes
can be examined by studying five hypothetical sets of enrollees - none of
whom have health insurance apart from purchase through an Exchange
created pursuant to PPACA. For each set of enrollees, I use the National
Bureau of Economic Research's "TAXSIM" project4 6 to calculate likely
marginal federal and state tax rates. I use simulation software I have devel-
oped here to determine the effective marginal tax rates created by
PPACA's conditioning of both premium subsidies and cost-sharing reduc-
tions on relative income.
A. The Jones Family
The Jones family, the family described in the introduction to this arti-
cle, is a family of four residing in Mississippi with a relative income of 3.85
($85,000). The family has high medical expenses. The family incurs a me-
dian amount of $28,000 and a mean amount of $30,000. The Exchange
rates the family as being thirty-five years old and thus facing a gross pre-
mium of $8,722. For that, the family gets a contract with a $4,000 deducti-
ble, 30% coinsurance, and an $8,000 out-of-pocket limit. The family's net
premium is $8,075, due a premium tax credit under section 36B of the In-
ternal Revenue Code. Given the family's high medical expenses, their ex-
pected cost-sharing is $7,938. Before PPACA, this family would have faced
46. See Daniel Feenberg & Elisabeth Coutts, An Introduction to the TAXSIM Model, 12 J.POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 189 (1993). A wealth of information on the TAXSIM model as well as a TAXSIM
calculator may be found on the Internet at http://www.nber.org/-taxsim/ (last visited May 20, 2010).
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a marginal income tax rate of 34.4%, resulting from 14.3% federal income
tax, 15.3% FICA tax and 4.8% state income tax. Now, however, when the
Jones family increases their relative income by 10%, the family receives no
premium tax credit and thus has a net premium of $8,722. This amounts to
an additional 7.6% marginal tax on their income. Moreover, the family
faces an increase of $2,684 in expected cost-sharing because the out-of-
pocket limit on their policy, which they are likely to hit, increases from
$8,000 to $12,000. Thus, after PPACA, the family faces a marginal tax rate
of 73.5%, an increase of 114.1% over their previous marginal rate.4 7
47. This calculation assumes the Secretary does not readjust the contract parameters to take
account of the CAVL proviso. If the Secretary readjusted the parameters, the results could be substan-
tially different. It is possible that at an initial relative income of 3.85 the Jones family would already
have an out-of-pocket limit of $12,000. Increasing their relative income by 10% would not change this
fact. Thus, in this particular instance, making the CAVL provision binding would result in PPAA's
increasing the Jones marginal tax rate by only 22.2% to 42%. The Jones family is an example of a case
in which it makes a big difference whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services is compelled to
readjust insurance contract parameters to comply with the CAVL proviso.
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relative income 3.85 ($85,000.)
federal poverty line 22,050
median 28,000.
distribution of
medical expenses mean 30,000
age 35
relative income relative income
3.85 4.24
premiums gross premium 8,722 8,722
net premium 8,075 8,722
relative income relative income
3.85 4.24
contract parameters f4000, 0.3, 8000) (4000,0.3,12000)
(CAVL not binding)
cost sharing expected cost 7,938 10,622
sharing (CAVL not binding)
contract parameters (4000, 0.3,12000) (4000,03, 12000)
(CAVL binding)
expected cost 10,622 10,622
sharing (CAVIL not binding) ________________
federal income 0.143
tax marginal rate







sarn not binding 0.)3
total effective 0 b1
marginal income tax rate binding 042
increase in anotlbining 1.141
marginal income tax 4binding 0.2
rate caused by PPACA
B. The Gonzalez Family
The Gonzalez family is a family of four residing in Texas with a rela-
tive income of 2.8 ($61,740). The family has a risk of substantial medical
expenses. The median amount the family incurs is just $2,400 but the mean
is $12,000. The Exchange rates the family as being thirty years old and thus
facing a gross premium of $6,267. For that, the family gets a contract simi-
lar to the Jones' family's contract: a $4,000 deductible, 30% coinsurance,
and an $8,000 out-of-pocket limit. The family's net premium is $5,507, due
a premium tax credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code.
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Given the family's significant medical expenses, their expected cost-sharing
is $2,906. Before PPACA, this family would have faced a marginal income
tax rate of 30.3%, resulting from 15% federal income tax, and a 15.3%
FICA tax. Texas has no state income tax. As with the Jones family, how-
ever, when the Gonzales family now increases their relative income by
10%, however, the family receives a smaller premium tax credit and thus
has a net premium of $6,267. This amounts to an additional 12.3% margi-
nal tax on their income. Their contract becomes less advantageous, with an
$8,000, rather than $6,000, out-of-pocket limit. This increases the family's
expected cost-sharing to $3,222. Thus, after PPACA, the family faces a
marginal tax rate of 47.7%, an increase of 57.5% over their previous margi-
nal rate.48
48. If the CAVL constraint were binding, the family's marginal tax rate would increase by only
40.6% to 42.6%.
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relative income 2.8 ($61,740.)
federal poverty line 22,050
median 2,400.
distribution of
medical expenses mean 12,000
age 30
relative income relative income
2.8 3.08
premiums
gross premium 6,267 6,267
net premium 5,507 6,267
relative income relative income
2.8 3.08
contract parameters 14000, 0.3, 60001 (4000, 0.3, 8000)
(CAVL not binding)
expected cost 2,906 3,222
sharing (CAVL not binding)
contract parameters (4000, 0.3,120001 14000,0.3, 120001
(CAVL binding)
expected cost 3,599 3,599
sharing (CAVL not binding) ________________
federal income 0.15
tax marginal rate







section 1402 marginal rate 
0.3, 12000}
sarbinding 0
total effective 0.15t not binding 0.477
marginal income 3inding 0.426
increase in not binding 0.575
marginal income 0 binding 0.406
rate caused by PPACA
C. The Sutters Family
The Sutters family is a family of six residing in California with a rela-
tive income of 2.4 ($70,872). As the heads of their household are some-
what older, the Exchange rates them as being fifty years of age. The family
has higher medical expenses than many with a median of $12,000 per year
and a mean of $24,000 per year. Due to the family's lower relative income,
they receive a more advantageous contract than the Jones family or the
Gonzalez family. It has a deductible of $4,000, coinsurance of 30%, and an
out-of-pocket limit of $6,000. Their gross premium is $10,656, but their net
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
premium is only $5,457, thanks to a generous premium tax credit. Due to
substantial medical expenses, the Sutters family's expected cost-sharing is
$5,026. Before PPACA, the Sutters family would have faced a combined
marginal tax rate of 36.3%. PPACA creates an issue for the Sutters family
when their relative income increases by 10%. As with the other families,
the Sutters family's premium tax credit declines so that their net premium
for insurance increases to $6,592. Thus, PPACA imposes a 16% marginal
tax for the reduction in premium subsidies. The result is that the Sutters
family now has a hefty marginal tax rate of 52.3%, a 44.1% increase over
the rate they faced before PPACA was enacted.4 9
49. If the CAVL proviso were binding, PPACA would have a more dramatic effect. It is likely
that the Sutters family originally would have had an out-of-pocket limit of $8,000, which would have
risen to $12,000. Their expected cost-sharing would have gone from $5,931 to $7,062. Thus, they would
have faced a marginal tax rate of 68.3%, an increase of 88.1% over the rate they paid before PPACA.
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relative income 2.4 ($70,872.)
federal poverty line 29,530
median 12,000.
distribution of
medical expenses mean 24,000
age 50
relative income relative income
2.4 2.64
premiums gross premium 10,656 10,656
net premium 5,457 6,592
relative income relative income
2.4 2.64
contract parameters 14000, 0.3, 6000) (4000, 0.3, 6000)
(CAVL not binding)
cost sharing expected cost 5,026 5,026
sharing (CAVL not binding)
contract 14000, 0.3, 8000) (4000, 0.3, 12000)
parameters (CAVL binding)
expected cost 5,931 7,062
sharing (CAVL not binding) _______ _______
federal income 0.15
tax marginal rate








section 1402 marginal rate
FICA binding 0..1
total effective not bndng 0.523
marginal income tax rate binding 0.683
increase in CALnot binding 10.441
marginal income tax 3binding 0.8
rate caused by PPACA
D. The Van Ost Family
Mr. Van Ost is a single forty year-old man living in New York with a
relative income of 2.9 ($31,407). He is about average for medical expenses
with a median expense of $1,000 and a mean expense of $4,000. His gross
premiums for insurance are $4,538, but the section 36B tax credit lowers his
net premium to $2,893. His expected cost-sharing is $1,316. Before
PPACA, Mr. Van Ost faced a marginal tax rate of 37.2%. With PPACA,
however, Mr. Van Ost sees his net premium increase to $3,282, and his out-
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of-pocket limit on his contract increase from $3,000 to $4,000. His ex-
pected cost-sharing thus increases to $1,418. The net result is that Mr. Van




relative income 2.9 ($31,407.)
federal poverty line 10,830
median 1,000.
distribution of
medical expenses mean 4,000
age 40
relative income relative income
2.9 3.19
premiums ~ gross premium 4,538 4,538
net premium 2,893 3,282
relative income relative income
2.9 3.19
contract parameters (2000, 0.2, 3000) 12000, 0.2, 40001
(CAVL not binding)
cost sharing expected cost 1,316 1,408
sharing (CAVL not binding)
contract (2000, 0.2, 6000) (2000, 0.2, 60001
parameters (CAVL binding)
expected cost 1,498 1,498
sharing (CAVL not binding)
federal income 0.15
tax marginal rate








section 1402 marginal rate Ill
CAVL binding 0
total effective CAVL not binding 
0.525
marginal income tax rate CAVL binding 0.496
increase in CAVL not binding 
0.413
marginal income tax CAVL binding 0.334
rate caused by PPACA
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50. If the CAVL proviso were binding, Mr. Van Ost's marginal tax rate would have increase by
only 33.4% to 41.3%. The smaller increase would have occurred because his expected cost-sharing
would not have increased as a result of the change in relative income.
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E. The Lincoln Family
The Lincoln family is a lower income family of three residing in Illi-
nois. Their relative income is 1.4 ($25,634). Led by a sixty year-old
mother, the Lincoln family has significant medical expenses: a median of
$5,000 per year and a mean of $18,000 per year. The gross premium
charged by the Exchange is high - $18,414 per year - but tax credits de-
crease it to a far more manageable $2,631. The low relative income also
gets the Lincoln family an advantageous insurance contract: a deductible of
just $400, coinsurance of 3% and a $4,000 out-of-pocket limit. Thus, not-
withstanding high medical expenses, their expected cost-sharing is just
$792. An increase in the Lincoln family's relative income has a serious
effect. Although their premium tax credit does not decline, they are now
subject to a less advantageous contract. The deductible has increased to
$1,330 and the coinsurance to 9%, though the out-of-pocket limit has re-
mained unchanged at $4,000. Now, the Lincoln family's expected cost-
sharing is $1,926. Although even before PPACA the Lincoln family faced a
high marginal rate of 53.9%, owing to the operation of earned income
credit, the increase in cost-sharing has brought the effective marginal tax
rate to a staggering 98.2%. PPACA has increased marginal tax rates by
82.1%.
51. Whether the CAVL constraint was binding or not would not affect this result because the
relevant CAVL constraint operates only where relative incomes are more than 2.5.
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relative income 1.4 ($25,634.)
federal poverty line 18,310
distribution of median 5,000.
mean 18,000medical expenses m n ,
age 60
relative income relative income
1.4 1.54
premiums
gross premium 18,414 18,414
net premium 2,631 2,631
relative income relative income
1.4 1.54
contract parameters 1400., 0.03, 40001 (1330., 0.09, 40001
(CAVL not binding)
cost sharing expected cost 792 1,926
sharing (CAVL not binding)
contract 1400., 0.03, 40001 (1330., 0.09, 4000)
parameters (CAVL binding)
expected cost 792 1,926
sharing (CAVL not binding) ________________
federal income 0.323
tax marginal rate
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statebinding 0.442
total effective CALnot binding 0.982
marginal income tax rate binding 0.982
incrasein AVLnot binding 0.82 1
marginal income 0 binding 0.821
rate caused by PPACA
VI. CONCLUSION
A. The Problem
The examples above confirm the earlier analysis that, in many in-
stances, the federal health care reforms enacted in 2010 will significantly
increase total effective marginal tax rates to an extraordinarily high level.
As I will now discuss, this dramatic increase in effective marginal tax rates
among a significant part of the American population creates the potential
for a significant diminution in economic activity.
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One of the usual concerns raised by high marginal tax rates is their
proclivity to diminish economic activity or to shift economic activity into
less productive forms that manage to evade the tax. Increases in marginal
tax rates may be enough to deter some individuals from taking the effort
and risk implicit in many forms of income-seeking activity. Moreover, re-
search suggests that the distorting effects of increases in marginal tax rates
increase not in a linear fashion, but generally with the square.52 Thus, a
50% marginal tax rates distorts choices not twice as much as a 25% margi-
nal tax rate, but four times as much.
PPACA creates exactly the sort of high marginal rates likely to cause
trouble. It would not be surprising to see significant reaction among per-
sons with marginal tax rates at the 50% level. As effective marginal tax
rates head towards or even in some instances over 100%, this possibility of
diminished economic activity grows. Some persons, for example, who need
or want health insurance acquired through an Exchange, may cut back as a
result on activities generating cash income. Similarly, PPACA may lead
second earners in a family to decide to perform domestic services person-
ally rather than purchase such services in the marketplace. Experience
with the program and a likely growth in educational materials (beyond this
law review article) on the consequences of PPACA should further exacer-
bate the problem. Although the precise magnitude of the problem will de-
pend in part on the number of persons eligible for subsidies through
purchase of health insurance through an Exchange, 53 any significant cut-
back in economic activity will reduce the very state and federal tax reve-
nues needed to support PPACA expenditures.
B. Why Does the Problem Exist?
The high effective marginal rates of tax created by the current health-
care reform bills are the result of two problems: "notching" and
"architecture."
52. HARVEY ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE, IN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC CHOICE 252, 256 (Charles
K. Rowley & Friedrich Schneider eds., 2004).
53. This number is likely to depend on at least three factors: (1) the number of employers who
stop providing health insurance coverage in light of the new regulatory system; (2) the success of the
penalty provisions contained in PPACA section 1501, 26 U.S.C. § 5000A, on the failure to purchase
insurance; and (3) the diminution in the effectiveness of the penalty created by various exceptions and
exemptions, such as those created for participation in "health sharing ministries" or an inability to
purchase insurance for less than 8% of income. With respect to the first factor, a recent poll shows that
14% of employers believe they would be better off dropping benefits as a result of PPACA. See Regis
Coccia, Most Employers Won't Drop Health Care Benefits: Poll, BUSINESS INSURANCE MAGAZINE,
April 12, 2010, available at http://www.businessinsurance.com/article/20100411/ISSUE01/304119948.
There is a serious question as to whether the exemption for only those health sharing ministries in
continuous existence since December 31,1999, renders that part of the statute constitutional on equal
protection or establishment clause grounds, since, so far as can be determined, the only qualifying
ministries require belief in Christianity as a condition of membership.
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1. Notching
Notching is another way of saying that there are discontinuities in the
subsidy amounts as a function of income, something that government pro-
grams generally attempt to avoid. Mathematically, this means that there
can be extremely high rates of effective taxation when "before" and "after"
incomes closely straddle the notch. A person who loses $1,000 in subsidies
as a result of earning one additional dollar, which can happen under
PPACA if, for example, the person crosses one of the cost-sharing subsidy
thresholds or crosses the 400% relative income cap on premium subsidies,
faces a marginal tax rate of over 100,000 %. The frequency of notches, the
size of the discontinuities, and the distribution of differences between
before and after incomes all contribute to the overall magnitude of the
notching problem.54
2. Architecture
The second problem, which I would term one of "architecture," is far
less tractable. It comes from attempting to render market-provided health
insurance affordable without undertaking fundamental reforms to the
healthcare payment system, and while declining to increase the cost of the
program by extending benefits to even wealthier Americans than the cur-
rent reform provides. To try a back-of-the-envelope style of computation,
if we are going to (1) subsidize people with relative income of 133% at
something like 80% of the full cost of health insurance coverage, a figure
that likely ranges from about $2,300 per person per year for a young person
in a low cost area up to $10,800 per year for an older person in a high cost
area;56 and (2) phase that down to zero by the time relative income is
400%, then, even without notching, the increment to marginal tax rates
created by healthcare reform has got to be on the order of six to thirty
percentage points. The computation is roughly the same if we look at a
family of four. With a family of such size, the government will need to
reduce subsidies from about $6,000 to $26,000 over 2.67 of FPL, which for a
54. An extremely sophisticated family might be able to reduce the effective rate of taxation by
limiting the difference between before and after income so that they just missed hitting a notch. In
most realistic circumstances, however, such fine tuning will be extremely difficult.
55. If one computes the quotient of (1) the sum for a person with a relative income of 1.33 of (a)
the net premium for enrollees purchasing insurance through an Exchange and (b) the expected cost-
sharing for such enrollees and divides that by (2) the sum for a person with a relative income of 4.01 of
(a) the net premium for enrollees purchasing insurance through an Exchange and (b) the expected cost-
sharing for such enrollees, one generally gets about 20%. Thus, the maximum subsidy for health cover-
age provided through an Exchange is about 80%. This figure varies depending on particulars such as
the family size involved, the age of the enrollees, and the health costs in the region where they purchase
the policy, but in the experiments I have conducted it tends to stay between about 78% and 82%.
Whether the CAVL proviso is binding does not significantly affect the outcome.
56. These figures are based on a calculator provided by the Kaiser Family Foundation. See supra
note 8. One takes 94% of the Kaiser-estimated premium and divides that by 0.7 (the actuarial value of
the policy) to obtain the total expected cost of the coverage provided by the insurance.
57. The change in subsidy ranges from $3,300 to $10,700. That is the numerator of the fraction.
The denominator is the change in income, which is 267% multiplied by the federal poverty line for an
individual. As of 2010, this amount is $10,830.
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family of four is about $58,900. Thus the increment to marginal tax rates
created by healthcare reform for families will need to be on the order of
eight to thirty-five percentage points. While an increase of six or even
eight percentage points to marginal tax rates is probably tolerable, an in-
crease of thirty to thirty-five percentage points should concern almost eve-
ryone. The problem is particularly grave when one is discussing either
poor families who face high marginal rates owing to the operation of the
earned income tax credit or larger families who may already be facing sub-
stantial pre-existing marginal taxes from a combination of federal income
tax, FICA tax, and state income tax. Thus, even if the notching problem is
reduced, we will still face a tradeoff between creating incentives that may
reduce the incentive to work and healthcare reforms that do not require
significant increase in taxes (or deficit finance) that affect large numbers of
Americans.
C. Curing Most of the Notching Problem
Most of the notches created by PPACA are the result of the mechanics
by which cost-sharing subsidies occur. Under sections 1402, 1411, and 1412
of PPACA, it appears that potential enrollees submit documentation relat-
ing to their family size and income to the relevant Exchange, which in turn
passes it to the Secretary of Health and Human Services. After going
through a variety of internal processes to determine the enrollees' eligibil-
ity for subsidization, the Secretary informs the ultimate insurance issuer of
the amount of premium subsidization and level of cost-sharing subsidies
the enrollee is to receive. So, for example, the Secretary might specify that
the enrollees are to receive a $150 per month premium subsidy and are to
face an out-of-pocket limit equal to two-thirds of the usual amount. Thus,
enrollees should know, at least in theory, in advance of each medical treat-
ment how much they will be required to pay out of pocket. There are no
rebates, and there are no additional payments required from the enrollees
to the plan or to the government. Moreover, the schedule translating in-
come ratios to cost-sharing amounts should be a relatively simple one: five
relative income bins and five resulting cost-sharing parameters.
Elimination of most of the notches would require cost-sharing parame-
ters to vary more or less continuously with the relative income of the en-
rollees. Much as section 1401 of PPACA uses specified applicable
percentages at certain relative income pegs to permit interpolation of an
"applicable percentage" for all levels of income, so, too, section 1402 could
be modified to permit cost-sharing parameters to vary continuously
throughout the eligibility band. Thus, if the out-of-pocket limit were set at
58. The back-of-the-envelope method actually understates the magnitude of the problem. This is
because we are approximating the relationship between subsidy and income as a line with a constant
slope (the marginal effective tax rate). In fact, however, the way sections 1401 and 1402 of PPACA
operate, the relationship is nonlinear. It is a mathematical fact that in connecting two points with a
continuous locus, the way to minimize the maximum absolute slope between the two points is with a
line. Thus, the nonlinear relationships created by PPACA actually result, at least for certain values of
income, in marginal tax rates higher than those shown by the back-of-the-envelope computation.
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one-third of the normal limit for enrollees with relative income of 133%
and set at one-half of the normal limit for enrollees with relative incomes
of 200%, one could linearly interpolate the out-of-pocket limit for a person
with a relative income of, say, 180%, to be 45%. Or, if the deductible was
pegged at $200 for an enrollee with relative income of 133%, $1,000 for an
enrollee with a relative income of 200%, and at $2,000 for an enrollee with
relative income of 400%, the deductible for a person with relative income
of 350% could be linearly interpolated as $1,750.
Few perceptible problems would be created by moving to a system
that avoided notching with respect to cost-sharing subsidies. The computa-
tions are no more difficult than those used to compute premium subsidies
and are well within the capacities of the government and insurers. Drafting
statutory language to accomplish linear interpolation would require noth-
ing more complex than exists in section 1401 of PPACA. Providing sub-
stantial cost-sharing subsidies to the poorest families could be retained by
pegging high subsidy rates to relative incomes of 150% or even 200%. A
reasonable system that required linear interpolation should be roughly
budget-neutral. And while it would re-introduce some very modest notch-
ing, "roughness" such as copays of $13.12 per visit or coinsurance of
16.37% could be avoided through rounding to the nearest dollar or per-
centage point.
D. Curing the Architecture Problem
The final notch - the elimination of either premium reductions or cost-
sharing subsidies at a relative income of 400% - is part of what creates the
"architecture problem." Curing it is far more difficult than curing the
notching problem. Unless one figures out a way substantially to cut the
cost of health care or possibly the scope of coverage provided by health
insurance, one is left with unenviable choices. Otherwise, as now set forth,
to diminish the effective marginal tax rate, either the subsidies have to be
lower for the poor - which will enable yet fewer of them to purchase poli-
cies - or one has to extend subsidies to wealthier persons, such as a cutoff
at 600% of FPL. This latter approach has the potential to substantially
increase the cost of the program and require the government to obtain ad-
ditional tax revenue.
The graphic below illustrates the dilemma. The x-axis of the graphic
shows the relative income of the enrollees. The y-axis measures dollars.
Thin gray contour lines show combinations of income and net dollars spent
on health care that would yield the same percentage of income spent on
health care.5 9 Three dark lines numbered one to three are also present in
the graphic.
59. The contour for 8% is made thicker because that is the level at which the individual mandate
to purchase health insurance takes effect.
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Line 1 is the first of three lines showing a simplified relationship be-
tween relative income and the net expected cost of health care for a repre-
sentative family."o It presents a linearized and de-notched version of the
relationship created by PPACA. In Line 1, government subsidies are
phased out over 267% of relative income. The split between the enrollees
and the government for the total expected cost of covered health care (pre-
miums plus cost-sharing) goes from 20/80 at 133% relative income and
phases out linearly to 100/0 at 400% relative income. The relatively steep
slope of Line 1 indicates that the effective marginal tax rate is high. The
net payment increases greatly as relative income increases from 133% to
400%. For the representative family displayed, the effective marginal tax
rate induced by PPACA is about 20%. Notice also that with residual cost-
sharing included almost all of the individuals receiving subsidies are paying
well above 10% of their income for health care. Some pay more than 16%.
People do not pay less than 8% of their income for healthcare until they
have a relative income of more than eight ($176,400 for a family of four).
One way to reduce the effective marginal tax rate is to increase the
PPACA eligibility maximum. Line 2 shows the relationship between rela-
tive income and the net expected cost of health care for the same represen-
tative family where government subsidies are phased out from paying for
approximately 80% of expected health care coverage to 0% as the enroll-
ees move from relative incomes of 133% to 600%. The new marginal tax
rate induced by PPACA thus declines from 20% (as was the case under
Line 1) to 11%. Moreover, notice that the percentages of income families
pay for healthcare has declined significantly as a result of the liberalization
60. The family in question has four enrollees and is rated as being forty-three years old.
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of PPACA eligibility. No family expects to pay more than 12% of their
income for health care.
Although a program such as that shown via Line 2 increases the af-
fordability of healthcare and reduces the marginal effective rate of taxation
created by income-sensitive subsidies, those successes come at a price. The
cost of a subsidy program can be thought of as the subsidy per set of enroll-
ees for each income level multiplied by the number of sets of enrollees at
each income level. Those costs must be met either by deficit finance or by
some form of taxation, one that likely depends substantially on income.6 1
Programs such as that in Line 2 substantially increase both the subsidies
received over all income levels from 133% of FPL to 600% of FPL, some-
times quite dramatically. They thus require substantial amounts of tax rev-
enue, perhaps on the order of double that required by programs such as
Line 1. Raising that tax revenue will require increases in marginal tax rates
over some group of American taxpayers. If only a small subset of Ameri-
can taxpayers are asked to foot the bill, the increase in marginal tax rates
could be substantial.
The price of phasing out healthcare subsidies more slowly diminishes,
however, if a broad portion of American income is taxed to pay for the
increases in the costs of the program that will occur as a result. Suppose,
for example, it took $100 billion per year to pay for subsidies that did not
phase out until 600% of FPL. If the United States GDP is on the order of
$14 trillion, a tax of less than 1% will raise more than enough money. Of
course, if it took more than $100 billion per year and the taxable income
were less than $14 trillion, the marginal tax rate could go significantly
higher. The former possibility is more likely if the extension of subsidies to
the upper middle class leads more large employers to drop healthcare cov-
erage. Still, it is hard to imagine marginal tax rates approaching anything
like the double-digit levels routinely created by PPACA as it stands.
Phasing out the subsidies more slowly would make healthcare more
affordable for many and reduce the problem of high effective marginal tax
rates highlighted in this article. It would, however, require more money to
pass through the hands of the federal government and likely at least some-
what increase federal income tax rates. It would be far more difficult to
maintain, as was done during the 2009 and 2010 debate over healthcare
reform,62 that a significant expansion of access to care could be had for a
price tag less than $1 trillion.
For those queasy about increases in tax burdens or transfer payments
to the upper middle class, the only other way to lower the marginal effec-
tive tax rates created by PPACA without fundamentally altering the cost of
healthcare delivery is to decrease the maximum subsidy. Line 3 shows the
61. Unfortunately, the data needed to perform this computation is not readily available. Thus,
only very crude estimates of the actual numbers are possible.
62. The accuracy of that claim has come under increasing question recently. The Chief Actuary
for the Center for Medicare and Medicaid services issued a report in April 2010 indicating PPACA will
result in higher healthcare costs than had previously been acknowledged. See Foster, supra note 17.
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relationship between relative income and the net expected cost of health
care for the same representative family where government subsidies are
phased out from paying for approximately 46% of expected health care
coverage to 0% as the enrollees move from relative incomes of 133% to
400%. As with Line 2 (and by construction) the marginal effective tax rate
is now just 11%.
Moving to a system such as Line 3 also has significant costs, however.
The poor will be asked to pay about 20% of their income on health care
expenses, something unlikely to be within the means of many. Thus, while
moving to a system such as that represented in Line 3 reduces the marginal
effective tax rates created by healthcare reform, it seriously undermines a
major purpose of having healthcare reform in the first place.
E. A Path to Reform
As Professor Daniel Shaviro wrote a decade ago, "[a] little-known ef-
fective marginal tax rate structure, which results from layering multiple in-
come-conditioned transfer phaseouts on top of various income-related
taxes, is hard to rationalize."' The problem Professor Shaviro noted years
ago, which then manifested in a family earning $25,000 doing no better
than a family earning $10,000, has now recurred with the passage of
PPACA, and has again done so under the radar screen. While there was
extensive debate on whether the premium tax credits and cost-sharing sub-
sidies under PPACA were large enough - witness the effects of the
HCEARA bill generally enlarging tax credits and cost-sharing subsidies
from the original PPACA - there has been precious little written about the
effects of generous subsidies on effective marginal tax rates." This is a
serious omission from the debate.
The behavioral distortions induced by high effective marginal tax rates
could well be significant. Standard economic theory suggests that it should
lower the supply of labor produced by the millions of workers whose in-
come falls within 100% to 400% of FPL, particularly from those workers
whose income falls near the section 1402 notch points and among those
who have high expected medical expenses. The result is in turn likely to be
an increase in the price of the labor these groups tend to provide. The
price increase is likely to cause transfer of some jobs to humans overseas or
to replacement of human labor by machines, even where it might not be
economically efficient to do so. To the extent these substitutions do not
63. Shaviro, supra note 45.
64. One exception is Professor Greg Mankiw of Harvard whose blog entry of October 10, 2009,
makes many of the same points made in this article. See Greg Mankiw, Marginal Tax Rates from
Health Reform (Oct. 10, 2009), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2009/10/marginal-tax-rates-from-
health-reform.html. The Congressional Budget Office also noted the issue in a July, 2009 white paper,
Congressional Budget Office, Economic and Budget Issue Brief, Effects of Changes to the Health In-
surance System on Labor Markets (July 13, 2009), http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/104xx/doclO435/07-13-
HealthCareAndLaborMarkets.pdf. However, little if any discussion appeared in the later CBO reports
to Congress as the health care bills evolved. None of the public debate on the House floor immediately
prior to the bill's passage referenced any effect on marginal tax rates.
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incur, the increased price for labor is likely to result in an increase in the
price of goods and services produced by these low and middle income
workers.65 Were such a depression in employment to occur, it could not
only have ripple effects throughout the economy but also decrease the in-
come-contingent tax revenue needed to fund the bill, as well as the remain-
der of the federal budget and state budgets.
Fortunately, it is not yet 2014. There is time to consider modifications
to the bill that would reduce its most drastic effects. One such fix would be
to eliminate the "cliff effect" of cutting off the 36B tax credit at a relative
income of 400%. Rather the tax credit could be phased out a linear way so
that it was zero at relative income of 600%. A second fix would be, as set
forth above, to permit cost-sharing parameters to vary more or less contin-
uously with the relative income of the enrollees.
The impediments to reform prior to 2014 are multiple. At bottom, we
currently have an intellectual failure, a blindness almost engineered by the
zeal to get health care "done" while not totally reneging on challenging
promises to make health care coverage affordable while keeping the costs
of the reform at least somewhat under control. In describing the failure, I
can do little better than Professor Daniel Shaviro in an article written a
decade ago about a different set of government wealth transfers.6 6 We
have "a failure to understand that the circumstances of the poor are only
marginally, not fundamentally, different than those of the near-poor. [. . ]
[T]here has been a widespread failure to understand that phasing out a
benefit as income increases has identical incentive and distributional effects
to explicitly imposing a positive marginal income tax rate.",6  Until we
cope more honestly with the tradeoffs involved, the result of the current
healthcare reforms on productivity and tax revenue is likely to be consider-
ably more significant than is generally understood.
65. See Shaviro, supra note 45.
66. See Shaviro, supra note 45.
67. See Shaviro, supra note 45.
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